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PATENT, BUT WHERE IS HOME AND GLOBAL JUSTICE?        
A RAWLSIAN AND SENIAN INQUIRY 
DR. DEMING LIU 
INTRODUCTION 
The patent system is designed to grant inventors and innovators exclu-
sivity over their inventions for a limited period in exchange for public dis-
closure of their inventions. The patent is thus often taken as “a way of 
maximizing social welfare by providing incentives for inventors to increase 
the stock of applied technical knowledge in society (through protection) 
and discouraging inefficient redundancy of inventive effort (through dis-
closure).”1 Some believed that the idea of patents as incentive to innovate 
germinated in the minds of the Venetians when they put in place the patent 
system in the fifteenth century.2 In England, it was “unusual” for the patent 
system to be put in the context of stimulating inventive activities before the 
mid-eighteenth century; “[t]he close association of letters patent with Court 
patronage until the end of the seventeenth century . . . defined them princi-
pally as instruments of the royal prerogative.”3 It was not until the late 
eighteenth century that the claim had emerged that the patent system serves 
as an incentive to invention and the monopoly granted is the quid pro quo 
for disclosure of the invention to promote inventive efforts.4 The system 
was implemented in the United States, where Thomas Jefferson approved it 
 Lecturer in Law, Newcastle University Law School/United Kingdom. 
1. John S.Leibovitz, Inventing a Nonexclusive Patent, 111 YALE L. J. 2251, 2256 (2002). 
2. Jean Tirole & Antilano Jorge Padilla, Intellectual Property and the Future of Innovation in
Europe, Speaking at A Centre for the New Europe Market Insights Event (Oct. 10, 2001). For specific 
discussion on the Venetian system of patent, see e.g., Carlo Marco Belfanti, Guilds, Patents and the 
Circulation of Technical Knowledge: Northern Italy during the Early Modern Age, 45 TECHNOLOGY 
AND CULTURE 569–89 (2004). Further on the origins of the patent system, see Harold C. Wegner, 
PATENT HARMONIZATION (Sweet & Maxwell 1993). 
3. CHRISTINE MACLEOD, INVENTING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: THE ENGLISH PATENT 
SYSTEM, 1660–1800 182 (Cambridge U. Press 1988). In contrast, see RICHARD GODSON, A PRACTICAL 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS AND OF COPYRIGHT 6 (London Saunders & Ben-
ning, 1844) (“It was under the auspices of Queen Elizabeth that the Huguenots settled in Norwich, 
Sandwich, Colchester, and other places, where they carried on woollen and linen manufactories to the 
great benefit of the country. It was by her charter that the East India Company was established; which 
grant, though a very great monopoly, has contributed very largely to the splendour and influence of 
England in the scale of nations.”). 
4. MACLEOD, supra note 3, at 182. 
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to realize his ideal to protect innovative manufacture.5 Now it is embodied 
in the U.S. Constitution which states that the purpose of patent law is “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to . . . inventors the exclusive Right to their . . . Discoveries.”6 
Many eminent economists, such as Adam Smith, supported the patent 
system. Adam Smith believed that patents for new machinery and copy-
right over books were “the easiest and more natural way the state can rec-
ompense them for hazarding a dangerous and expensive experiment, of 
which the public is afterwards to reap the benefit.”7 On another occasion, 
he praised the patent as a harmless exclusive privilege: 
It was probably the fairest reward for ingenuity that could be devised, 
since it was unlikely that the legislature would give pecuniary rewards, 
so precisely proportioned to the merit as it is. For here, if the invention 
be good and such as is profitable to mankind, he will probably make a 
fortune by it; but if it be of no value, he will also reap no benefit.8 
Some argue that: 
IP law [whereof patent is part] is simply a machine to generate innova-
tion through economic incentives; and that lawyers are merely engineers 
called on occasionally to tweak or tinker with the mechanism. Such 
scholars celebrate when (from their perspectives) the machine works 
well, and they lament when it runs poorly-but it’s all just gears and 
switches either way.9 
So the economics theory is employed to develop this area of law as the 
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Mazer v Stein that the economic philosophy 
is applied to explain the U.S. Constitution clause of intellectual property 
law.10 Lemley throws doubt on whether the Chicago School law-and-
economics movement theory is applicable to intellectual property; further, 
he believes that “the ‘propertization’ of intellectual property is a very bad 
idea. . .If anything, the public nature of a good seems to suggest that 
propertization is a uniquely bad idea, precisely because the consumption of 
5. THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 334 (Andrew A. Lipscomb &
Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 1905). 
 6.. U.S.CONST. Art.1, § 8, cl. 8. 
7. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 754
(Oxford Univ. Press 1976). 
8. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 83 (Ronald L. Meek et. al., eds., 1978). 
9. PETER JASZI, Is There Such a Thing as Postmodern Copyright?, in MAKING AND UNMAKING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CREATIVE PRODUCTION IN LEGAL AND CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 416 (Mario 
Biagioli & Martha Woodmansee eds., 2011). 
10. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause
empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individu-
al effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and 
inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve 
rewards commensurate with the services rendered.”). 
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that good is ‘nonrivalrous’—it does not take away from the creator of that 
good.”11 As Thomas Jefferson put it, “he who lights his taper at mine, re-
ceives light without darkening me.”12 
Heller and Eisenberg showed the problem with patent from another 
perspective, i.e., the “tragedy of the anticommons” in contrast with the 
“tragedy of the commons.”13 Garrett Hardin coined the latter to help ex-
plain the problems of overpopulation, air pollution, and species extinc-
tion.14 Those problems arise because people overuse resources they have in 
common and they have no incentive to conserve. “By contrast, a resource is 
prone to underuse in a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ when multiple owners 
each have a right to exclude others from a scare resource and no one has an 
effective privilege of use.”15 In such a case, “a user needs access to multi-
ple patented inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream patent 
allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product devel-
opment, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of downstream biomedical 
innovation,” thereby creating more complex obstacles to the progress of 
“Useful Arts”——the tragedy of the anticommons.16 
That poses the question of whether patent is the ideal way to incentiv-
ize and reward invention. As with Smith and others mentioned before, it 
has become the routine argument in supporting patent that “it seems but 
just that he, who informs the public of a new method of increasing their 
wealth, should gather for himself the first fruits of his ingenuity and la-
bour” and that is best done through the patent.17 However, this view does 
not consider the contribution of others in the invention,18 far less the inter-
est of others. Further, it fails to take justice into account. Just because the 
patent may also benefit society when the inventor benefits from it does not 
mean that it is just to allow him the exclusive ownership for twenty years, 
because the patent is, inter alia, “oppressive to inferior tradesmen”.19 
11. Mark A. Lemley, Book Review, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 873, 902 (1997) (reviewing JAMES BOYLE,
ROMANTIC AUTHORSHIP AND THE RHETORIC OF PROPERTY SHAMANS, SOFTWARE, AND SPLEENS: LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY (1996)). 
12. JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 334. 
13. Michael Heller & Rebecca Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in
Biomedical Research, SCIENCE, May 1, 1998, at 698. 
14. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at 1243. 
15. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 698. 
16. .Id. at 699.
17. GODSON, supra note 3, at 19. 
18. See generally GAR ALPEROVITZ & LEW DALY, UNJUST DESERTS: HOW THE RICH ARE
TAKING OUR COMMON INHERITANCE AND WHY WE SHOULD TAKE IT BACK (The New Press 2010). 
19. GODSON, supra note 3, at 20. 
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The patent system needs re-examining from the fresh perspective of 
justice. This is because justice is a necessity for civil society, being “the 
most fundamental of all virtues for ordering interpersonal relations and 
establishing and maintaining a stable political society.”20 Further, as the 
world is becoming more and more integrated and patent goes global, it 
raises the question of whether patent promotes or hinders global justice. 
That question is important not only because patent affects developing coun-
tries’ access to technologies, but also because it impacts access to medicine 
for the least advantaged people. Charles Darwin once famously said, “If the 
misery of the poor be caused not by the laws of nature, but by our institu-
tions, great is our sin.”21 Now the question is how to design the patent insti-
tution such that society becomes more innovative and the welfare of the 
poor is promoted. In answering the question, the article seeks to rethink 
patent and, in introducing Rawls’ theory of justice (and where appropriate, 
Sen’s idea of justice) into the debate, we dispute the traditional justification 
for patent, and we further dispute the imposition of patent on the develop-
ing countries in the context of access to medicine. Whilst we recognize that 
it is not feasible to dismantle the patent system, we argue that global justice 
is promoted and can be realized when discourse is engaged with the partic-
ipation of all players to rework the patent system and hammer out the ideal 
form of protection for inventions and technologies. After this introduction, 
the article next examines Rawls’ theory with particular emphasis on the 
difference principle. Then, Part II looks at the traditional justification for 
patent, and where appropriate, evaluates it in the light of Rawls’ difference 
principle of justice. Part III discusses whether the patent system is suitable 
for the developmental needs of the developing countries. Part IV focuses 
on the issue of global justice vis-a-vis patent. In this part, we examine 
health-related patents; we also expand our discussion to include patent, 
generally. We debate on the ideal of Rawlsian global justice and then on 
the realization of global justice through the Senian public discourse. We 
advocate public reasoning as the feasible means in addressing global injus-
tice. Part VI concludes the article. 
I. RAWLS AND HIS THEORY OF JUSTICE 
In developing a theory of justice, Rawls commences with the “original 
position,” whereby free and equal people negotiate behind a veil of igno-
20. Wayne P. Pomerleau, Western Theories of Justice, INTERNET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY,
http://www.iep.utm.edu/justwest/. 
21. CHARLES DARWIN, VOYAGE OF THE BEAGLE 500 (1876).
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rance to agree on a set of principles to regulate the basic structure of a well-
ordered, i.e., just, society.22 Rawls introduces the concept of “a veil of igno-
rance” in the following terms: 
[N]o one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, 
nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and 
abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that 
the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special 
psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a 
veil of ignorance.23 
In other words, parties to the negotiation are hypothetically ignorant of 
“their place in society, their class position or social status, their good or ill 
fortune in the distribution of natural talents and abilities”;24 they are 
“ghosts ignorant of the machines they will haunt.”25 
The principles of justice are those upon which “the interests and ends 
of individuals depend.”26As Rawls says, they are “the principles that ra-
tional and free persons concerned to further their own interests would ac-
cept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the 
terms of their association.”27 They would govern the basic structure of so-
ciety, a just society into which “these disembodied souls would agree to be 
born.”28 But those principles would only be arrived at when all are regarded 
as free and equal, with no one allowed greater bargaining power than oth-
ers, and when they are oblivious of their talents or status acquired at birth. 
To induce such principles, parties are attributed a bare set of commitments 
which Rawls terms as the “primary goods”: rights, liberties, and opportuni-
ties; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect.29 The goods 
are “things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever else he 
wants”.30 They are evenly and equally distributed to each party. Parties are 
to choose the principles on the basis of the set of commitments. 
Rawls believes that parties would adopt the maximin policy, a policy 
that maximizes the position of the least well-off member of the society. As 
22. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 118 (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) [hereinafter RAWLS,
THEORY]. 
23. Id. at 12.
24. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 272 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
LIBERALISM]. 
25. STEVEN PINKER, THE BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE 150 (Penguin
2002). 
26. John Rawls, Fairness to Goodness, 84 PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW 536, 546–47 (1975) [hereinaf-
ter RAWLS, FAIRNESS]. 
27. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 11. 
28. PINKER, supra note 25, at 150. 
29. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 23. 
30. Id. at 92.
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such, he proposes two principles of justice which he believes rational peo-
ple would agree to govern the basic structure of the society.31 The two prin-
ciples are lexically ordered; the first is prior to the second. The first 
principle, also known as the principle of equal liberty, concerns “rights and 
liberties”; it provides that “each person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.”32 This 
principle is fundamentally important; so much so that Rawls puts in place 
the above lexical ordering to ensure that it cannot be traded off for the sec-
ond principle, below; namely, liberty cannot be sacrificed even where that 
would lead to greater wealth.33 Sen argues that, to Rawls, “there is some-
thing very special about the place of personal liberty in human lives,” and 
“Rawls puts liberty on an absolute pedestal that towers indisputably over 
all other considerations.”34 
The second principle embodies two further principles, the principle of 
fair equality of opportunity and the principle of difference. The principle of 
fair equality of opportunity concerns opportunities and provides that social 
and economic inequalities are to be “attached to positions and offices open 
to all.” In other words, people should enjoy equal opportunities regardless 
of their race, color, etc. Here, an inequality of opportunity is permissible 
only if it “enhances the opportunities of those with the lesser opportuni-
ty.”35 The difference principle concerns “income and wealth” and provides 
that “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage.”36 This principle 
is also rephrased as indicating that the inequalities “must be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society.”37 Rawls sets out the 
circumstances of justice as where “human cooperation is both possible and 
necessary”; he argues: 
Although a society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage, it is 
typically marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. There is 
an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better 
life for all than any would have if each were to try to live solely by his 
own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since men are not indifferent 
as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distrib-
31. Id. at 11.
32. Id. at 302.
33. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE 59 (Penguin 2009). 
34. Id. 
35. See N.E. SIMMONDS, CENTRAL ISSUES IN JURISPRUDENCE JUSTICE, LAW AND RIGHTS 58
(London: Sweet & Maxwell 2008) (the second principle in essence means that “social and economic 
inequalities are just only in so far as they work to the advantage of the least advantaged people in 
society”). 
36. Id. 
37. RAWLS, LIBERALISM, supra note 24, at 291. 
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uted, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser 
share.38 
To achieve justice, inequalities and freedom of pursuit of a larger 
share are allowed only in so far as they maximally enhance the benefit of 
the least well off, i.e., the maximin dictate. One question arises here: Who 
are the least advantaged? Freeman explains, “since one’s share of income 
and wealth generally corresponds also with one’s share of the primary 
goods of powers, positions of authority, and bases of self-respect, we can 
regard the least advantaged to be the economically least advantaged people 
in society—i.e., the poorest people.”39 To put it another way, they are the 
“people who earn the least and whose skills are least in demand – in effect 
the class of minimum-wage workers.”40 
The difference principle “represents . . . an agreement to regard the 
distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits 
of this distribution whatever it turns out to be.”41 Rawls believes that the 
talented should earn premiums, but the premiums are used to contribute to 
the welfare of the least well off. Then one may ask where the incentives for 
the creation of the talented come from and how it can be assured that the 
talented are to continue their efforts. To address those concerns, Rawls 
does not deny the use of incentives. In his second principle, he “accepts the 
use of incentives to draw out the best efforts of the more talented to the 
extent that they contribute to the welfare of all, starting with the least ad-
vantaged.”42 
Utilitarianism regulates the relationship between persons in an “aso-
cial” sense and holds that each has the duty to contribute the most to “the 
welfare of mankind”; mutual aid bonds people together.43 For Rawls, jus-
tice concerns the allocation of the benefits derived in “cooperative enter-
prise” as people relate to each other under common institutions; “for 
justice, which requires that our institutions be arranged so as to maximize 
the expectations of the worst-off group in our society.”44 In other words, 
Rawls is concerned about creating a perfectly just institution that can be 
installed in a democratic society; justice is achieved as long as a perfectly 
just institution is designed and put in place, the so-called “transcendental 
38. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 126. 
39. SAMUEL FREEMAN, RAWLS 106 (2007). 
40. Id. 
41. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 101. 
42. Charles Fried, Book Review, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1696 (1972) (reviewing JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971)). 
43. T. M. SCANLON, Rawls’s Theory of Justice, in READING RAWLS, CRITICAL STUDIES OF A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 201 (Norman Daniels ed., 1975). 
44. Id. at 202.
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institutionalism.”45 With fair equality of opportunity in place, development 
of each individual would even out the arbitrary distribution of talent and 
“undercut the dominance of the best off groups”; and ultimately, “the in-
centives to encourage development of socially valuable talents and skills 
would be reduced.”46 
II. EVALUATION OF PATENT JUSTIFICATION FROM RAWLS’
PERSPECTIVE 
Having discussed Rawls’ theory, we now evaluate patent justification 
from the perspective of justice. The question arises, can Rawls be used to 
examine whether the patent system is justifiable? Freeman believes that 
“[a] primary role of the difference principle is that it is to be applied to 
specify appropriate forms of ownership and property rights and responsibil-
ities, as well as permissible and impermissible transactions in the economic 
system.”47 Rejecting the narrow view of the basic structure as “limited to a 
scheme of constitutional liberties plus the system of tax and transfer” or as 
constituting “all coercive political and legal institutions,” Kordana and 
Tabachnick argue for the broad view that “all aspects of social living that 
affect citizens’ life prospects constitute the basic structure.”48 Indeed, Da-
vid Resnik has no hesitation in applying Rawls to patent. 
Resnik insists that under Rawls, “the patent system is fair in a national 
context because it respects intellectual property rights and it benefits the 
least advantaged members of society by providing incentives for inventors, 
investors, and entrepreneurs.”49 It is true that Rawls allows the use of in-
centives even where that would lead to social and economic inequalities, so 
long as that works to the benefit of the least advantaged. The difference 
principle apparently supports the view that people would not work produc-
tively without the incentive. Hence, the use of incentive can be justified 
and be just, precisely because it would benefit the least advantaged, despite 
the inequalities that ensue; for the same reason, the resulting economic and 
social inequalities are just.50 Cohen disagrees with Rawls on many issues, 
45. SEN, supra note 33, at 5. 
46. NORMAN DANIELS, Rawls’s Complex Egalitarianism, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS
252 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). 
47. FREEMAN, supra note 39, at 103. 
48. Kevin A. Kordana & David H. Tabachnick, Rawls and Contract Law, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
598, 606 (2005). 
49. David B. Resnik, Fair Drug Prices and the Patent System, 12 HEALTH CARE ANALYSIS 91, 
92–93 (2004). 
50. Andrew Williams, Incentives, Inequality, and Publicity, 27 PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS
225 (1998). 
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but regarding this issue of incentive, he believes that where incentives are 
necessary for the sake of justice, they must be used “in a sense uncondi-
tional on the voluntary choices of talented workers: the talented must be 
incapable of working in ways beneficial to the least advantaged without 
unequal rewards.”51 
To Sen, the issue of inequality generating incentives reflects the fun-
damental flaw in Rawls’ theory of justice. On the one hand, Sen does not 
deny that incentives may, in practice, be necessary to increase productivity, 
and they cannot be avoided in Rawls’ theory: 
Productivities do . . . get indirect recognition through their role in ad-
vancing efficiency and equity, so that inequalities related to them are al-
lowed and defended in the Rawlsian distributive theory if those 
inequalities help the worst-off people to be better off as a result, for ex-
ample through the operation of incentives. Obviously in a world in which 
individual behaviour is not solely moulded by the ‘conception of justice’ 
in the original position, there is no way of avoiding incentive prob-
lems.”52 
However, be that as it may, Sen throws doubt on whether the original 
position would be the one as postulated by Rawls and indeed whether the 
two principles which Rawls believed people would adopt behind the veil of 
ignorance would be the ones that people would actually adopt: 
[I]f in the original position inequalities based on the demands of incen-
tives were judged to be wrong and unjust (they can be seen as something 
like bribes given to people to make them diligent at their work and ap-
propriately productive), then should not the principles adopted at the 
original position eliminate the need for incentives? If a just economy 
should not have inequality arising from incentives, should not the princi-
ples emerging in that state of impartiality take the form of people agree-
ing to do their respective bits without the need to be bribed? And, on the 
basis of Rawlsian reasoning that, in the post-contract world, each person 
will behave in conformity with the conception of justice emanating from 
the original position, should we then not expect, in that duty-oriented 
world, spontaneous compliance by everyone with their respective pro-
ductive duties (as a part of that conception of justice), without any need 
for incentives?53 
Leaving aside the contention over the issue of whether the allowance 
of incentive in Rawls’ difference principle undermines his theory of justice, 
we next apply Rawls in re-evaluating various justifications for patent. 
Whilst it is true, that under Rawls, incentive is allowed with qualification, 
the issue is whether incentive in the form of patent meets his theory of jus-
51. Id. at 226.
52. SEN, supra note 33, at 5. 
53. Id. at 61.
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tice and, hence, achieves justice. As will be seen, the use of patent as incen-
tive is far from just under Rawls, because it does not benefit the least ad-
vantaged while creating social and economic inequalities. 
The extensive discussion in literature of the rationales underlying the 
patent system mostly concentrates on the so-called “invention-inducement 
theory,” a theory postulating that the patent system induces inventions; 
some believed that “[a]lmost all empirical work” concerning the role of the 
patent system has been tuned to the theory.54 As a matter of fact, various 
theories have been put forward; in this article, my discussion is conducted 
with particular reference to the incentive theory, the development and 
commercialization theory, and the disclosure theory as concisely catego-
rized by Nelson and Mazzoleni.55 
Now let us first look at the invention-inducement theory. The theory 
posits that patent provides the inducement to invent, assuming that there 
would be no invention without patent inducement or, the stronger the pa-
tent protection, the more inventions would be made.56 For the adherents of 
the theory, the social benefit of an invention lies in its final use value and 
the patent inducement would result in more inventions, despite that the 
social cost of the patent is the exclusion of use by others of the patented 
invention for a limited period of time.57 Invention-inducement theory ad-
herents hold that the social benefit exceeds the social cost, thereby justify-
ing the monopoly.58 
However, the theory is fraught with fallacies. First, it makes no dis-
tinction among industries or, in the modern wave to globalize the patent 
conception worldwide, among countries, blindly assuming the universality 
of its application. A UNCTAD study covering a wide range of corporations 
found that the role of patents vis-à-vis invention not only differs from in-
dustry to industry, but also varies from country to country.59 The latter will 
be addressed later on. Now, let us further examine the former, viz., the 
significance of patent as an incentive for inventions and innovations differs 
from industry to industry. 
54. Richard D. Nelson & Roberto Mazzoleni, Economic Theories About the Costs and Benefits of
Patents, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND RESEARCH TOOLS IN MOLECULAR BIOLOGY 25 
(1997), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK233535/. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. GAIA/GRAIN, Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity: The Economic Myths, GLOBAL
TRADE AND BIODIVERSITY IN CONFLICT (1998) [hereinafter Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiver-
sity], available at http://www.grain.org/briefings/?id=14. 
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An empirical study by Cohen revealed that patents are only significant 
to innovation in a small number of industries.60 Another study by Mansfield 
showed that less than 10% of inventions in electrical equipment, office 
equipment, motor vehicles, and several other industries would not have 
been developed, absent the patent incentive.61 A large study conducted in 
the UK came to the conclusion that “formal IP regimes are applicable only 
to a small proportion of business activity, such as large manufacturing 
companies.”62 Meanwhile, the studies by Cohen and Mansfield both 
showed that in the pharmaceuticals and chemicals industries, where the 
patents are regarded as most important, sixty percent and thirty percent of 
inventions, respectively, are attributable to the patent incentive. 
The patent system, by granting blanket monopolies, fails to accommo-
date the above variations. If we consider Cohen’s qualification of Rawls’ 
difference principle, the patent incentive is simply unnecessary in the vast 
majority of cases; those companies and economically advantaged parties 
would work to invent, patent or not. With the patent, they are allowed to 
create inequalities by maintaining a monopolistic price for their inventions, 
which are unjust and morally wrong. 
Second, the incentive theory fails to acknowledge that patents may not 
be the best incentives for inventions. Some studies revealed that the biggest 
incentives for innovation are those other than patents. One found that com-
petition for market share exerted the largest influence,63 which is similar to 
the finding of another study that the advantages of reaping returns from 
inventions at a “head start” outrun those from patents.64 The use of the 
monopolistic patent incentive for innovation, however, helps to create the 
60. WESLEY M. COHEN, Empirical Studies of Innovative Activity, in HANDBOOK OF THE
ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION AND TECHNICAL CHANGE (Paul Stoneman ed. 1995). The varying degrees 
of use of IPRs amongst different industrial sectors, e.g., the pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics, and 
aircraft jet engines industries, were revealed by the Chief Scientific Adviser to the British Cabinet 
Office as far back as December, 1983. See CABINET OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND 
INNOVATION, 1983, Cmnd. 9117. It was also found that it was very hard “to assess how much IPRSs 
contribute to the well-being and technical progress of the UK”; and that IPRs are only one “not easily 
identifiable way” to achieve success in market place. Many other relevant factors include “the size and 
quality of R&D investment; the lead time of product development; marketing skills, and the reliability 
of products.” Id. at 8. 
61. Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation, 32 MGMT. SCI.ENCE 173, 175 n.8 (1986). 
62. Conclusions of ESRC Intellectual Property Research Programme conducted by University of
Manchester, Institute of Science and Technology. See R. Coleman & D. Fishlock, Background and 
Overview of the Intellectual Property Initiative (2002), available at 
 http://info.sm.umist.ac.uk/esrcip/background.htm. 
63. MORTON I. KAMIEN & NANCY L. SCHWARTZ, MARKET STRUCTURE AND INNOVATION (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1982). 
64. Richard C. Levin et. al., , Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Develop-
ment, 1987 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 783, 783–820 (1987). 
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“winner-take-all” system, resulting in an overall excessive expenditure of 
R&D.65 
That enables the winner to charge a high monopolistic price; without 
patent, competition would allow many firms to practice the invention, max-
imizing access and leveling the price.66 Under Rawls’ difference principle, 
any social or economic arrangement including the patent arrangement 
would aim to promote the welfare of the least advantaged. But, the effect of 
the patent scheme is clear; the least advantaged, i.e., the poorest people in 
society, may well be excluded from the invention for monopolistic prices. 
Further, the patent system is capable of being abused and stifling in-
novation. As John Jewkes et al. pointed out: 
Patents may be taken out, especially by corporations, not with the inten-
tion of making use of the invention but simply for the purpose of block-
ing competitors or being in a position to make bargains with them. It is 
not known how far this has increased the number of patents taken out by 
corporations, but it seems likely that the blocking patent is most common 
in the chemical and electrical fields.67 
Indeed, in Bement v. National Harrow Co., the U.S. Supreme Court 
held: 
If [the patentee] see fit, he may reserve to himself the exclusive use of 
his invention or discovery. If he will neither use his device nor permit 
others to use it, he has but suppressed his own. . . . His title is exclusive, 
and so clearly within the constitutional provisions in respect of private 
property that he is neither bound to use his discovery himself nor permit 
others to use it.68 
In another case, the same Court said, “[a] patent owner is not in the 
position of quasi-trustee for the public or under any obligation to see that 
65. Emmanuel Combe et. al., Pharmaceutical Patents, Developing Countries and HIV/AIDS
Research, INTERNATIONAL AIDS ECONOMICS NETWORK, May 19, 2003, at 151. 
66. Id. 
67. JOHN JEWKES ET AL., THE SOURCES OF INVENTION 106–07 (1959). “[T]he right to exclude
others from the use of the invention . . . is not an offense against the Anti-Trust Act,” United States v. 
United Shoe Mach. Co., 247 U.S. 32, 57 (1918), but “[t]he fact that the patentee has the power to refuse 
a license does not enable him to enlarge the monopoly of the patent by the expedient of attaching 
conditions to its use.” Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 666 (1944). The latter 
act may be objectionable under the so called “the patent misuse doctrine.” Its present status is that “[a] 
patent owner may exploit a patent in an improper manner by violating the antitrust laws or extending 
the patent beyond its lawful scope.” 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 19.04 (2003). But 
the doctrine was attacked in USM Corp. v. SPS Technologies, Inc., 694 F.2d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1982): 
“The doctrine of patent misuse has been described as an equitable concept designed to prevent a patent 
owner from using the patent in a manner contrary to public policy. This is too vague a formulation to be 
useful . . . .” In other jurisdictions, if provided under national laws, they may be attacked under the anti-
competitive practice or dealt with by compulsory licensing. 
68. 186 U.S. 70, 90 (1902) (quoting Heaton-Peninsular Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., 77 F. 288,
294–95 (6th Cir. 1896)). 
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the public acquires the free right to use the invention. He has no obligation 
either to use it or to grant its use to others.”69 
Liebenau showed that, during the formation of the chemical industry, 
patents did not serve to “reward inventors equitably for their intellectual 
labour.”70 Rather, they “reflected the relative superiority of the German 
industry” and they were “used as tools themselves by a German industry 
which was relying on their ability to corner large sections of the fine chem-
icals market.”71 In the decade of 1900–1910, “[o]f 862 [U.S.] patents [in 
organic colors], 701 were held by Germans, as opposed to only 11 held by 
Britons, and 19 by Americans. Swiss inventors held a further 115, making 
the German and Swiss holdings account for well over 90 per cent of all 
American organic colour patents.”72 Consequently, it is argued that “[t]hose 
German firms which acquired a large number of American patents had 
begun to use the patent system as a weapon in their attempt to secure mar-
kets by blocking domestic competition from American manufacturers” and 
that “they used their powerful market position to compel foreign firms to 
join them in international control or cartel agreements in which patents 
played an important role.”73 In Britain, German companies employed the 
same strategies by taking out a large number patents, and it is complained 
that “[a] good many of those patents have been taken out not for the pur-
pose of working the patents in this country, but for the purpose of prevent-
ing their being worked.”74 
Under Rawls’s theory of justice, no one in the original position would 
allow the inequalities created by patent together with such practices of its 
owners. Indeed, it is unjust that the interest of the poorest is hindered where 
the patent owner refuses to use it or where he prohibits others from using it 
or simply blocks others from entering into the business. 
The incentive theory is inextricably connected with the development 
and commercialization theory which holds that “[p]atents induce the in-
vestment needed to develop and commercialize inventions.”75 In support 
for the theory, the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act is often cited as a successful in-
stance. The Act allows universities to hold the patent rights of their public-
ly funded inventions, thus allowing them to grant exclusive licenses to 
69. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 432 (1945). 
70. Jonathan Liebenau, Patents and the Chemical Industry: Tools of Business Strategy, in THE
CHALLENGE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY: INNOVATION IN BRITISH BUSINESS SINCE 1850 135, 148 (1988). 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 139.
73. Id. at 144.
74. Id. at 146.
75. Nelson & Mazzoleni, supra note 54, at 17. 
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commercial entities to develop their inventions; without the propriety 
rights, a commercial company would be unlikely to develop a university 
invention.76 This theory is open to attack from several perspectives. 
First, the patents may baffle the purpose of public funds financing in-
ventions. The research conducted in universities as financed by public 
funds is purported to promote the progress of science and technology as 
well as facilitate the learning needs of the society, but with the Act, univer-
sities are transformed into commercial entities: 
In the past, discovery for its own sake provided academic motivation, but 
today’s universities function more like corporate research laboratories. 
Rather than freely sharing techniques and results, researchers increasing-
ly keep new findings under wraps to maintain a competitive edge. What 
used to be peer-reviewed is now proprietary. . . . In trying to power the 
innovation economy, we have turned America’s universities into cut-
throat business competitors, zealously guarding the very innovations we 
so desperately want behind a hopelessly tangled web of patents and roy-
alty licenses.77 
Further, it is science itself that suffers in the long run, as the patenting 
culture does not encourage basic research, which may not result in immedi-
ate patentable inventions. Basic research seldom attracts private funding; 
indeed, “[t]he primary function of a firm is to make profits, not to extend 
the range of pure knowledge.”78 Because the patent regime will divert the 
public funding to areas other than the basic research, the basic research 
may be left undone.79 Where basic research is conducted, it is likely to be 
patented if possible. But, “[p]atenting a new basic science technique, or 
platform technology, puts it out of the reach of graduate students who 
might have made tremendous progress using it.”80 
Second, the patenting of inventions financed by public funding is un-
fair to taxpayers; the consumers (taxpayers) would be taxed twice—tax 
mechanisms and monopoly pricing.81 Arguably, such research as financed 
by public funds should benefit the public and lessen its burdens, rather than 
76. Id. at 22–23. 
77. Janet Rae-Dupree, When Academia Puts Profit Ahead of Wonder, N.Y. TIMES (N.Y.), Sept. 7,
2008, at BU4, available at  
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/07/technology/07unbox.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&. 
78. JEWKES ET AL., supra note 67, at 139. 
79. Some argued that the universities in the United States have compromised their “mission to
carry out and disseminate the results of basic research” with commercial considerations. Sasha Blaug, et 
al., Managing Innovation: University-Industry Partnerships and the Licensing of the Harvard Mouse, 
22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 761, 761 (2004). 
80. Rae-Dupree, supra note 77. 
81. See Combe et al., supra note 65. 
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be used to exploit it by channelling its money into the hands of a handful of 
commercial entities.82 
Third, the claimed success of such a regime as the U.S. Bayh-Dole 
Act was doubtful. On the one hand, it appears that the Act worked in the 
United States; since the passage of the Act in 1980, about 4,000 commer-
cial entities have been created at academic and nonprofit institutions engag-
ing in technology transfer, and it is reported that in 1999 alone, $40 billion 
worth of technology transfer was generated by more than 200 U.S. univer-
sity teaching hospitals and research institutions.83 On the other hand, it is 
not clear whether the Act really worked. The cost of obtaining a patent can 
exceed $15,000, and the chance for returns for most universities in effect is 
slim; the latest data indicate that “fewer than half of the 300 research uni-
versities actively seeking patents have managed to break even from tech-
nology transfer efforts” and that 13 universities generate almost two-thirds 
of trackable revenue.84 
Then it is not clear whether what the Act was thought to have 
achieved would have been achieved without it. Professor David Mowery 
believed that the effects of the Act in the United States were overestimated; 
“[i]n the biomedical field, there is no evidence to corroborate that Bayh-
Dole did what it [purportedly] did. . . . In the ‘80s and ‘90s, much would 
have taken place without Bayh-Dole.”85 It is equally believed that “public 
expressions of public research, such as publications, meeting, and confer-
ences as well as informal interactions and consulting” are more effective 
factors in the flow of public research results to industries.86 A patent 
scheme, such as Bayh-Dole is simply a dispensable incentive in enabling 
people to work productively; but the effect is, as seen previously, not to 
promote the interest of the least advantaged. The justice under Rawls is 
hardly achieved. 
In the traditional justification for patent, apart from the above theories, 
another theory is the disclosure theory, which posits that society is better 
off by exchanging monopoly for the disclosure of the invention. Obviously, 
the theory “presumes that secrecy is possible and sufficient to induce in-
vention.”87 As Nelson and Mazzoleni pointed out, this theory contradicted 
82. Id. 
83. Ken Howard, Global Biotech Expansion Taking Cues from Bayh-Dole, 22 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 919, 919 (2004). 
84. Rae-Dupree, supra note 77. 
85. Howard, supra note 83, at 920 (quoting David Mowery). 
86. Id. 
87. Nelson & Mazzoleni, supra note 54 at 21. 
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the incentive-invention theory: it is secrecy that induces invention; the pa-
tent is only to induce the disclosure of the invention.88 
If disclosure through patent incentive could be justified, then “the in-
cremental learning from the patents [must be] sufficient to outweigh the 
costs to society of preventing anyone from using that learning to implement 
the technology for twenty years.”89 However, that case cannot be made 
out.90 The fact is that scientists and others simply do not read patents to 
learn the state of the art; rather, they turn to “article preprints, conferences, 
and conversations with colleagues.”91 Where they do read patents, they 
would not learn much, as “the Federal Circuit has permitted a number of 
vague general disclosures that don’t in fact communicate very much to 
anyone, and patent lawyers often have incentives to write those vague dis-
closures.”92 The bargain for disclosure of invention “would only benefit the 
public if the public could not independently obtain the same infor-
mation . . . for less than the cost of granting a patent.”93 Given the above, 
the scheme of disclosure for invention through patent does not benefit the 
public. When evaluated under Rawls, the interest of the public including 
the least advantaged is not promoted through the scheme and it is hardly 
possible to argue that the difference principle is satisfied and justice 
achieved. 
Furthermore, another fallacy of this theory is that it presumes that dis-
closure is possible with patent inducement. However, the truth is that, 
where secrecy is possible and economically justifiable, patent would not 
induce disclosure if the inventors want to keep their inventions secret. 
Lemley argues that: 
[T]he available evidence suggests that companies primarily rely on pa-
tent protection to protect self-disclosing inventions: those that the inven-
tor could not maintain as a trade secret after putting it into commercial 
practice. If an invention can be kept secret, inventors are more likely to 
forego patent protection and keep it secret.94 
88. Id. at 21, 26.
89. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 747 (2012). 
90. Id. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette shows through empirical studies that actually many scientists do
read patents to keep abreast of the state of the art in nanotechnology; but the studies further show that 
the reason why patent readers may not get much is because many patents do not meet the requirements 
for disclosure. Hence, that reveals the divergence of expected behaviour and actual behaviour, which 
we address in later discussion. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 544, 552 (2012). 
91. Lemley, supra note 89, at 746–47. 
92. Id. at 745.
93. Ouellette, supra note 90, at 547. 
94. Lemley, supra note 89, at 746–47. 
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Under Rawls’ theory of justice, is it just that the economically and so-
cially advantaged maintain their undeserved, unjust, privileged economic 
and social advantage by keeping inventions secret in disregard of the inter-
est of the least advantaged? One may argue that doing so would allow them 
to maintain their position in the market and suppress their competitors. 
Whilst their market behavior may not be the concern of the theory of jus-
tice, what is the concern of justice, is the interest of the least advantaged 
and the parity of inequalities with the social arrangement. Where they keep 
technologies away from society, they sustain the inequalities and prevent 
others access to it, and encourage wasteful repetitive investment and inven-
tion which undermines the social welfare. They also increase the price of 
technologies by suppressing competition, but more importantly, by doing 
so, they make the technology less accessible to the poorest people than 
otherwise. The effect is twofold: first, it aggravates inequalities and 
strengthens the social and economic position of the most advantaged; sec-
ond, it undermines the interest of the least advantaged. Clearly, under 
Rawls, it is unjust to keep the inventions secret. Then, where the invention 
could be made accessible to the least advantaged when it cannot be kept 
secret, patent erects a new hurdle by allowing monopolistic prices to be 
imposed on society and ensuring that only those people who are economi-
cally capable of affording the prices enjoy it. It is patent that deprives the 
poorest people of access to the invention. 
The disclosure theory reveals the actual behavior of people, which 
they would not be supposed to exhibit in a would-be ideal society function-
ing under the predicates of morality and justice; henceforth, the above 
Rawlsian analysis would strike one as highly utopian. It is Rawls that seeks 
to construct a perfectly just institution, assuming that people would behave 
justly by sticking to the two principles of justice. Sen departs from Rawls 
by asking how to deal with people’s actual behavior. 
[E]ven if we do accept that the choice of basic social institutions through 
a unanimous agreement would yield some identification of “reasonable” 
behaviour (or “just” conduct), there is still a large question about how 
the chosen institutions would work in a world in which everyone’s actual 
behaviour may or may not come fully into line with the identified rea-
sonable behaviour. . .the pursuit of justice is partly a matter of the gradu-
al formation of behaviour patterns – there is no immediate jump from the 
acceptance of some principles of justice and a total redesign of every-
one’s actual behaviour in line with that political conception of justice.95 
As far as using patent to incentivize disclosure is concerned, some 
may say that without patent, people’s actual behavior may well be to free 
95. AMARTYA SEN, THE IDEA OF JUSTICE, 68–69 (2009). 
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ride on another’s invention and reap what he has not sown; so using patent 
addresses people’s actual behaviors by encouraging disclosure and prevent-
ing free riding. But the crucial issue is, what is wrong with free riding and 
would free riding hinder invention? Indeed, if we divert from Rawls for 
now and address people’s actual behaviour, the question is, would free 
riding impede invention, thereby depriving society of the inventions? 
It is hard to prove that free riding will impede invention. Evidence, 
however, seems to point the other way. The development of the computing 
technology industry has been largely based on a software free sharing cul-
ture; though some big companies later began to pursue patent monopolies, 
they now increasingly realized that such a free sharing culture is crucial to 
their further development.96 IBM, for example, recently announced that it 
will put some of its patented software into public domain for free use since 
its development is being hampered by the patents; by such an action, it is 
hoping to induce others to follow suit.97 Following the open source soft-
ware initiative, BiOS (Biological Open Source), was established to make 
relevant biotechnologies unhampered by patent law.98 In combating the 
problems such as the tragedy of the anticommons in the latest nanotechnol-
ogy, some organizations offer free open source software to promote re-
search by hundreds of universities throughout the world.99 More and more 
are taking similar action, making freely available a whole range of software 
such as microscope-control programs and molecular modelling pro-
grams.100 
The “free open source software” has benefited Google and Facebook, 
which rely on it for their survival. 101 Companies that make their software 
free for use also benefit; one case is Red Hat, which offers its own version 
of the Linux computer operating system for free, but brings in an annual 
one billion dollars from the sale of services for the software.102 Further-
more, free software “reduces the barrier for small, nimble entities entering 
the market.”103 With that, it is the general public that benefits in the end. 
96. See IBM Frees 500 Software Patents, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4163975.stm (last updated Jan. 11, 2005); Bob Sutor, Open 
Source and IBM, NASA, http://www.nasa.gov/centers/johnson/pdf/47 8337main_2010–01-Sutor-
NASA-OpenSource.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); Open Source and Standards, IBM, http://www-
03.ibm.com/linux/ossstds/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
97. IBM Frees 500 Software Patents, BBC NEWS, (last updated Jan. 11, 2005). 
98. BIOS HOME, http://www.bios.net/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2014). 
99. Joshua M. Pearce, Make Nanotechnology Research Open-Source, 491 NATURE, 520 (2012). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
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As Pearce argues, “[w]ithout the shelter of an IP monopoly, innova-
tion would be a necessity for a company to survive.”104 As seen from 
above, factors other than patents underscore inventions; to survive in the 
market, firms have all the incentives to come up with better inventions. 
As far as medicines are concerned, it is only just that the poorest peo-
ple benefit from the R&D if one looks at the funding structure of those 
pharmaceutical companies. In combating the argument of those companies 
that they need patent to enable them to charge a premium price on their 
drugs to recoup their huge investment on research and development, 
Stiglitz argues that: 
[I]n the [U.S.], it is actually the government that finances most health-
related research and development—directly, through public support (Na-
tional Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation), and indi-
rectly, through public purchases of medicine, both in the Medicare and 
Medicaid programmes. Even the part that is not government-financed is 
not a conventional market; most individuals’ purchases of prescription 
medicines are covered by insurance.105 
Now, it is useful to visit Rawls to see how he would treat the issue of 
reward by granting patent property, and then what that would signify for 
innovative efforts. In developing the difference principle, Rawls has pri-
marily in mind “economic inequalities and distributions,” rather than “de-
sert and allocation”.106 Essentially, the principle “only requires that any 
inequality surplus be redistributed so as to maximize the expectations of the 
least advantaged.”107 
Rawls regards natural talents and social and economic circumstances 
as one’s lot in the natural lottery. They are arbitrarily distributed and moral-
ly undeserved, and are “social, rather than personal, resources.”108 He said, 
“The natural distribution is neither just nor unjust; nor it is unjust that per-
sons are born into society at some particular position. These are simply 
natural facts. What is just and unjust is the way that institutions deal with 
these facts.”109 To Rawls, “the question of ownership of our endowments 
 104. Id. 
105. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Shift from Patents Regime to Prize-Based System Will Revolutionise 
Research and Healthcare, THE ECONOMIC TIMES (May 21, 2012), 
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2012-05-21/news/31801096_1_drug-prices-drug-
companies-life-saving-medicines. 
 106. .TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, Distributive Justice and the Difference Principle, in JOHN RAWLS’ 
THEORY OF SOCIAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 132, 133 (H. Gene Blocker & Elizabeth H. Smith eds., 
1980). 
 107. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS: A RECONSTRUCTION AND CRITIQUE OF A 
THEORY OF JUSTICE 201 (1977) (emphasis omitted). 
 108. Id. at 62. 
 109. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 102. 
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does not arise.”110 What matters to Rawls is that “justice should seek to 
correct the social inequalities stemming from the arbitrary natural distribu-
tion of talents and abilities.”111112 His aim is to find a principle that “elimi-
nate[s] . . .  the social injustice of rewarding individuals for the accident of 
their possession of economically profitable native talents” and that “makes 
the fruits of those talents and abilities available to the members of society 
generally.”113 To Rawls, talents and abilities of individuals, inborn or de-
veloped, are simply “a collective asset,” which forms “a moral ideal, an 
ideal of justice,” to say that an individual deserves a share of his efforts is 
plainly wrong and unjust.114 
Martin argues that Rawls would agree with Nozick that “people are 
entitled to their natural assets,” hence to “what flows from [them],” subject 
to the constraints set by justice, i.e., as long as that contributes to the bene-
fit of the least-advantaged.115 Martin must be right, as in places other than A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls says that “[w]e have a right to our natural abilities 
and a right to whatever we become entitled to by taking part in a fair social 
process.”116 Thus, rather than the talented people deserving reward for their 
efforts, which would contravene “a first principle of distributive justice,” 
they are regarded as “legitimate expectations and entitlements, defined by 
reference to a scheme of social cooperation in order to measure correspond-
ing rewards and acquisitions.”117 Rawls is concerned with the construction 
of “a just scheme,” whereby each person is given his due or entitlement by 
the scheme itself.118 
As far as property is concerned, Rawls does not recognize it. Sen be-
lieves that “a general right to property is not an entitlement that Rawls has, 
 110. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 75 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) [hereinafter 
RAWLS, RESTATEMENT]. 
 111. Simmonds, supra note 35, at 97. 
 112. But Thomas Pogge construes Rawls to mean that the distribution of natural talents is a com-
mon asset: “We see then that the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the 
distribution of natural talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distribution whatev-
er it turns out to be.” THOMAS POGGE, REALIZING RAWLS 74 (Cornell U. Press, 1989) , at 101. 
 113. WOLFF, supra note 107, at 62. See Richard Mullender, Human Rights, Responsibilities and the 
Pursuit of A Realistic Utopia, 61 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 33, 41, 44 (2010) (asserting that Rawls would be seen 
as a proponent of “enterprise association.”). 
 114. CAHTERINE AUDARD, JOHN RAWLS 165 (Mcgill Queens University Press, 2007).   
 115. Id. 
 116. JOHN RAWLS, A Kantian Conception of Equality, in JOHN RAWLS: COLLECTED PAPERS 254, 
263 (Samuel Freeman ed.,1999). Rawls also says that “it is persons themselves who own their endow-
ments: the psychological and physical integrity of persons is already guaranteed by the basic rights and 
liberties that fall under the first principle of justice.” Rawls, supra note 110, at 75. 
 117. Audard, supra note 114, at 107. 
 118. RAWLS, THEORY, supra note 22, at 313. 
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in fact, defended in any of his works of which [he is] aware.”119 Just be-
cause Rawls makes room for incentives where they promote the welfare of 
the least well off does not mean that Rawls admits property right as an 
entitlement, no matter how tempting an inference one may draw therefrom. 
Sen believed “Rawls does allow inequalities in his perfectly just arrange-
ments for reasons of incentives when they enhance the deal the worst-off 
receive.”120 Sen argued “whether the acceptance of inequalities on grounds 
of incentives should have any role in what is claimed to be a perfectly just 
society is certainly debatable, but it is important to see that Rawls does not 
support unconditional property rights as a part of a libertarian entitle-
ment.”121 
Having discussed Rawls’ view on reward and property, let us address 
the question asked, namely: how to reward those who invent. Rawls has a 
just social scheme in mind, in which system the inventor is not entitled to 
such property as patent. The society can and possibly should reward inno-
vative endeavors by other means, such as direct and immediate financial or 
honorary reward, the benefit of which, as some observed, is that “[t]he 
inventor would benefit from, and be encouraged by, a reward that was in-
dependent of the hazards of commercial exploitation, and the public would 
gain from a swifter, more widespread diffusion of inventions.”122 Histori-
cally, in England, the Society of Arts adopted the anti-patent policy that 
those who applied for patent could not receive premiums from the Society. 
123 The aim of the Society of Arts was to benefit the public, and hence, 
disseminating inventions widely complied with its aim.124 
Much of the reward was indirect, through “honor,” which was clearly a 
reflection of the importance of signaling and reputation in this world. 
Nor can we altogether rule out any role for altruism, as well as a direct 
utility from being able to solve hard problems—what could be termed 
the ‘crossword puzzle’ motive. None of this is to suggest that money was 
unimportant to most inventors. But the patent system, for the vast ma-
jority of them, offered a false hope, and the expected payoff of a patent 
was in all likelihood negative.125 
 119. SEN, supra note 33, at 325. 
 120. SEN, supra note 33, at 32 
 121. Id. 
 122. MacLeod, supra note 3 at 190. 
 123. MAX LOUIS KENT, THE BRITISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE SPIRIT OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION: THE SOCIETY FOR THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF ARTS, MANUFACTURES AND COMMERCE 
(1754–1815) 222–23 (2007). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Joel Mokyr, Intellectual Property Rights, the Industrial Revolution, and the Beginnings of 
Modern Economic Growth, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 353 (2009). 
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Similarly, Joseph Stiglitz argues that “[p]atents are not the only way 
of stimulating innovation.”126 In the context of medicines, he advocates a 
prize fund, which is financed by developed countries that “would provide 
large prizes for cures and vaccines for diseases such as AIDS and malaria 
that affect hundreds of millions of people.”127 To him, “[t]he alternative of 
awarding prizes would be more efficient and more equitable. It would pro-
vide strong incentives for research but without the inefficiencies associated 
with [monopolization.]”128 
III. GLOBAL JUSTICE: PATENT VIS-À-VIS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Having disputed the justifications for patent, we next evaluate whether 
the patent system is suitable for the developing countries. It is plain that the 
developed countries imposed such a system on them through various trea-
ties under the auspices of economic development. But the truth is that the 
developed countries did not reach where they are now through the policies 
they are recommending to the developing countries; rather, “[m]ost of them 
actively used ‘bad’ trade and industrial policies, such as infant industry 
protection and export subsidies.”129 
In discussing the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century in 
England, Lecky noted: 
Scarcely a form of manufacturing industry had ever been practised in 
England that had not been fortified by restrictions or subsidised by boun-
ties. . . . [T]he merchants and manufacturers of England had for genera-
tions steadily and successfully aimed at two great objects—to secure for 
themselves by restrictive laws an absolute monopoly of the home mar-
ket, and to stimulate their foreign trade by bounties paid by the whole 
community.130 
 126. Joseph Stiglitz, Give Prizes Not Patents, NEWSCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. HA-JOON CHANG, KICKING AWAY THE LADDER: DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 2 (2002). 
 130. WILLIAM EDWARD HARTPOLE LECKY, A HISTORY OF ENGLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH 
CENTURY 229 (1890). “In 1784 Josiah Wedgwood formulated a plan to unite the activities of these 
local organisations to prevent the emigration of workmen or the introduction of foreign industrial 
pirates, who would spread England’s manufacturing secrets.” Merchants and manufacturers in Bir-
mingham formed various organisations to deal collectively with commercial affairs. They set out to 
oppose the abolition of the law banning the importation of brass. Wedgwood led the effort, with bare 
success, to prevent the free trade Treaty between England and Ireland. Schofield 352. The Irish parlia-
ment pursued the policy of imposing high tariffs on imports from Great Britain so that its fledgling 
manufacturing industries would develop and prosper. “International commerce is viewed as a bargain in 
which the advantages are to be mainly reaped by one side, rather than as a free interchange of natural 
products and manufactured goods to the reciprocal advantage of both the peoples concerned, the ques-
tion has to be fought out and determined fresh after every period of international war or revolutionary 
turmoil.” WILLIAM BURTON, JOSIAH WEDGWOOD AND HIS POTTERY 110 (1922). Likewise, Boulton 
2015] RAWSLIAN AND SENIAN INQUIRY 195
Indeed, the ladder-kicking game rings true in the interaction between 
the developed and the developing countries: 
It is a very common clever device that when anyone has attained the 
summit of greatness, he kicks away the ladder by which he has climbed 
up, in order to deprive others of the means of climbing up after 
him. . . . Any nation which by means of protective duties and restrictions 
on navigation has raised her manufacturing power and her navigation to 
such a degree of development that no other nation can sustain free com-
petition with her, can do nothing wiser than to throw away these ladders 
of her greatness, to preach to other nations the benefits of free trade, and 
to declare in penitent tones that she has hitherto wandered in the paths of 
error, and has now for the first time succeeded in discovering the 
truth.131 
Insofar as the intellectual property relationship amongst nations is 
concerned, the above apparently finds resonance. The United States once 
freely pirated intellectual property from other countries in its industrializa-
tion process; frustrated by lack of protection of his novels there, Charles 
Dickens committed himself to a bilateral treaty but eventually failed.132 As 
Andreas makes it clear: 
[A]s a young and newly industrializing nation the U.S. aggressively en-
gaged in the kind of intellectual-property theft it now insists other coun-
tries prohibit. . .In its adolescent years, the U.S. was a hotbed of intellec-
intellectual piracy and technology smuggling, particularly in the textile 
industry, acquiring both machines and skilled machinists in violation of 
British export and emigration laws. Only after it had become a mature 
industrial power did the country vigorously campaign for intellectual-
property protection.133 
Once it turned into a developed economy and an intellectual property-
exporting country, the United States immediately wielded its power in pro-
and other worthies from Birmingham vehemently pleaded the parliament for a bill prohibiting the 
exportation of buckle-chapes used for fastening the buckle to the strap. Boulton testified before the 
House of Commons Committee on April, 22 1760, arguing, “if the chape-makers continued to export, 
then foreign buckle-makers would benefit and his own trade would suffer” and “arguing unashamedly 
for his ruthless restriction on fellow manufacturers.” JENNY UGLOW, THE LUNAR MEN: THE FRIENDS 
WHO MADE THE FUTURE 103 (2010).  Wedgwood’s view on exportation of his creamware to China; 
“Wedgwood did not approve of this exportation; he was of opinion that if the oriental porcelain was 
made in forms better suited for European tables, it would materially injure the sale of English earthen-
ware in home as well as foreign markets.” SAMUEL SMILES, JOSIAH WEDGEWOOD, F.R.S.: HIS 
PERSONAL HISTORY 57 (Harper & Brothers 1895) 
 131. FRIEDRICH LIST, THE NATIONAL SYSTEM OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 295–296,(Sampson S. 
Lloyd MP. Trans., 1885) ,as cited in JOSEPH HANLON & TERESA SMART, DO BICYCLES EQUAL 
DEVELOPMENT IN MOZAMBIQUE?, at 39, (2008). 
 132. See generally JAMES BARNES, AUTHORS PUBLISHERS AND POLITICIANS: THE QUEST FOR AN 
ANGLO-AMERICAN COPYRIGHT AGREEMENT, 1815–54 (1974). 
 133. Peter Andreas, Piracy and Fraud Propelled the U.S. Industrial Revolution, adapted from his 
book SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE MADE AMERICA, (2013), available at 
http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-02-01/piracy-and-fraud-propelled-the-u-s-industrial-
revolution. 
196 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY [Vol 14:1
curing worldwide protection of its intellectual property; eventually it suc-
cessfully forced the issue of intellectual property within the framework of 
the WTO through the RIPS Agreement.134 Effectively, it means that any 
country that wants to develop its economy, which would be hardly possible 
without international trade in an age of globalization, must join the WTO 
and subscribe to the Agreement to implement minimum standards to pro-
tect intellectual property. Pogge complains, where conventions and treaties 
about intellectual property rights and others are negotiated: 
[T]he affluent societies, together controlling 82% of the global product 
and access to the world’s most lucrative markets, enjoy great superiority 
in bargaining power, information, and expertise over the poor societies 
as a group. Able and eager to exploit this superiority, they shape the 
global economic order as much as possible to their own advantage and 
capture the lion’s share of the benefits from economic interaction. The 
invisible hand guides things in the wrong direction, allowing the affluent 
societies to achieve higher rates of growth in per capita GDP, thereby 
further aggravating the discrepancy in bargaining power.135 
The imposition of the patent system on the developing countries under 
the WTO-TRIPS is problematic. Several studies have unanimously shown 
that such patent system is unlikely to benefit the developing countries and 
the costs are most likely to be very high. A study by the GRAIN examined 
the technology transfer myth, the innovation myth, and the foreign direct 
investment myth surrounding the patent system for the developing coun-
tries.136 It found that the developing countries’ low technology capability 
makes them unattractive recipients for technology transfers; where tech-
nology transfers occur, especially to the subsidiaries of the transnational 
corporations (TNCs), they are mainly older generations of technology.137 
TNC R&D abroad is small and often related to low-level technology, leav-
ing major R&D to be conducted back home on account of “economies of 
scale, the existing technological capabilities. . .and proximity to the point of 
consumption.”138 Concerning the IPR-innovation link, evidence shows that 
“much innovation and technology development occurs in the total absence, 
or profound uncertainty about the availability of IPRs.”139 The innovation 
by the farmers is an example; they never treat their germplasm as private 
property, but exchange it freely and build on their experience generation 
 134. See generally DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING HISTORY AND 
ANALYSIS, (Sweet and Maxwell Ltd., 4th ed., 2012). 
 135. Thomas W. Pogge, The Incoherence Between Rawls’s Theories of Justice, 72 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1739, at 1750 (2004). 
 136. See Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, supra note 59. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
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after generation to benefit themselves and others.140 In respect of the for-
eign direct investment myth, the study found that liberalization of financial 
market and investment laws,141 not IPRs, spurred the quadrupling between 
1982 and 1994 of global foreign direct investment (FDI). Of the $3.2 tril-
lion in U.S. FDI in 1996, most ended up in China, South Korea, and Singa-
pore, with China absorbing the greater part, but “neither China nor many 
other FDI ‘magnets’ in the South developing countries have developed 
[effective or strong] IPR systems.”142 The study inevitably concluded: 
The costs of TRIPs could well outweigh the benefits for countries of the 
South. [TNCs] will gain expanded market control, but the South is not 
bound to attract investment, technology transfer or experience economic 
growth because of stronger IPRs. Prices in certain sectors such as seeds 
and medicines will rise; monopoly conditions will constrain national 
firms; and the South’s subsidy to Northern [R&D] will rise. In the long-
term, the socio-economic fabric that supports innovation in the South 
will erode.143 
Another study commissioned by the UK government to investigate the 
impact of the intellectual property rights under the TRIPS on the develop-
ing countries made extensive research of other separate studies and found 
that the main conclusion of those studies is that “for those developing 
countries that have acquired significant technological and innovative capa-
bilities, there has generally been an association with ‘weak’ rather than 
‘strong’ forms of IP protection in the formative period of their economic 
development.”144 In considering whether IPRs would play a role in poverty 
reduction, disease fighting, health improvement, and access to education in 
developing countries, the UK study itself found that for most developing 
countries, IP protection at the TRIPS level cannot contribute significantly 
to growth, but weaker IP protection often can and that it will impose high 
costs for medicines and seeds and increase the cost of access to many prod-
 140. Id. 
 141. The size of FDI may have to do with many factors, economic, political and others. However, it 
is unknown which factor is the most important. A recent World Bank report summarized several cross-
country studies including both developed and developing countries and showed that FDI is greater in 
countries with sound institutions and lower in countries with high levels of official corruption, the large 
threat of expropriation and the weak rule of law. Khaled Fourad Sherif, Globalization of Investment and 
its Impact on the Developing World, KHALAD F. SHERIF’S HOMEPAGE, (2003), available at. 
http://www.ksherif.com/publications.html (noting though that the size of FDI may defy qualitative 
analysis as in Western standards, China has no better institutions than some of British former colonie, 
but it has absorbed the largest FDI in the developing world; maybe the reason is that commercial oppor-
tunities outweigh all other factors). 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Intellectual Property Rights and Biodiversity, supra note 59. 
 144. JOHN BARTON ET. AL., Integrating Intellectual Property Rights and Development Policy, 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, (Sept. 2002), available at 
http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/final_report/ciprcoverintrofinal.pdf. 
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ucts and technologies.145 Insofar as the role of the IPRs for R&D in fighting 
human diseases is concerned, the study pointed out that “the IP system 
hardly plays any role at all in stimulating R&D on diseases prevalent in 
developing countries. . .except for those diseases where there is a large 
market in the developed world”. 146 As one source pointed out: 
[T]he direction of pharmaceutical R&D has yielded few drugs targeting 
tropical diseases. Of the 1223 new chemical entities commercialized be-
tween 1975 and 1996, 379 were real therapeutic innovations, and less 
than 1% (13) were focused on tropical diseases. Of the 1% therapeutic 
innovations targeted against tropical diseases, the majority were either 
‘incidental’ discoveries recovered from veterinary medicine or molecules 
discovered by governmental or academic institutions and only later ac-
quired and commercialized by the Western industry.147 
As for TB, said to be currently affecting eight million people in devel-
oping countries, there has been no development of any new class of anti-
TB drug for more than 30 years.148 While HIV/AIDS face both developing 
and developed countries, the development of most HIV vaccines is being 
concentrated on genetic profiles of subtype B rather than types A and C; 
the reasons being that the former is prevalent in developed countries while 
the latter in developing countries.149 
A third study into the historical role of the patent system in developed 
versus developing countries by examining relevant data from 33,000 nine-
teenth-century inventions revealed that “what was good for America and 
Britain in the 19th century is not necessarily good for emerg-
ing. . .economies. . .like Denmark, the Netherlands and Switzerland.”150 
The modern significance of the study is that repeating the history, develop-
ing countries may be better off without strong patent laws. Switzerland did 
not have a patent law in the nineteenth century and was free to appropriate 
 145. Id. at 22. 
 146. Id. at 33. 
 147. TROUILLER P., OLLIARO P.L., Drug Development Output from 1975 to 1996: what Proprtion 
for Tropical Diseases?, POPLINE BY K4HEALTH, (1999), available at 
http://www.popline.org/node/532902.  
 148. See BARTON ET AL., supra note 144, at 33. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See Riordan, A Stroll Through Patent History, N. Y. TIMES, (Sept. 29, 2003), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/09/29/technology/29PATE.html; More studies and papers exist, arguing 
against the patent system for the developing countries. For example, a World Bank report argued that 
“IPR is not an appropriate mechanism to stimulate research in many areas of health and medicine, such 
as AIDS or malaria, where. . .the ‘social returns’ of an innovation to all those benefiting from it far 
exceed the returns to investors.” Butler, World Bank Calls For a Fairer Deal on Patents and 
Knowledge (1998) 395 NATURE 529, 529. (noting my thesis only concentrates on all these studies so far 
discussed). 
2015] RAWSLIAN AND SENIAN INQUIRY 199
ideas patented by innovators in other countries, enabling it to become a 
current world leader in watchmaking.151 
Recently, the multinational corporations begin to use patent to block 
HIV/AIDS sufferers’ access to essential drugs in developing countries. 
Take China for example: the official statistics released by the Ministry of 
Health of China showed that it had 840,000 HIV carriers, including 80,000 
AIDS patients, more than ten years ago.152 Ten years later, in 2012 alone, 
there were 17,740 deaths, an increase of 8.6 percent over the previous year; 
and there were more than 68,000 new cases of HIV/AIDS up to August 
2012.153 Those figures were given by the state media which allegedly had 
underreported the figures as so many AIDS carriers had not had the oppor-
tunity to be tested.154 China is adopting some preventive measures with an 
intent to keep the number of HIV/AIDS patients under the threshold of 1.2 
million by 2015.155 
The dilemma facing South Africa and other developing countries such 
as India and Brazil has largely been shared by China. Chinese companies 
developed no drugs for the treatment of AIDS and most of the available 
AIDS drugs are either protected by patents156 or covered by government 
pledges of protection.157 
In October 2002, the Chinese State Drug Administration (SDA) issued 
permission for the first time for a domestic company to produce and sell an 
AIDS drug, Zidovudine (AZT), which was no longer under patent protec-
tion in China.158 Three other AIDS drugs, namely, Didanosine (ddI), 
Stavudine (d4T), and Nevirapine (NVP), whose patents expired in 2001, 
were added.159 Consequently, the cost of treatment using these four drugs 
will be cut by up to 90%,160 thereby making them more affordable to the 
 151. Riordan, supra note 150. 
 152. China Faces Uphill Battle to Curb Fast Spread AIDS, CHINA DAILY, (Nov. 13, 2003) 
,[hereinafter Battle to Curb AIDS], available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/30/health/hiv-china-
li/index.html. 
 153. Madison Park, The price of blood: China faces HIV/AIDS epidemic, CNN, (Dec. 10, 2012), 
available at http://edition.cnn.com/2012/11/30/health/hiv-china-li/index.html. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Ron Popeski, China to promote condoms to cap HIV/AIDS cases, REUTERS (Beijing), Feb. 29, 
2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE81S0RN20120229. 
 156. See Battle to Curb AIDS, supra note 152. 
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AIDS sufferers. However, the problem is that the effectiveness of these 
drugs is open to doubt,161 whereas more effective drugs are still under pro-
tection in China and their prohibitive prices mean that they are not an op-
tion for most Chinese AIDS patients. In China, GlaxoSmithKline owns 
patent on the ARV drug 3TC for AIDS treatment. It is five times more 
expensive than the unpatented drugs, and consequently, is beyond the reach 
of most patients.162 
China is lobbying some western pharmaceutical giants such as Glax-
oSmithKline plc of Britain, Merck & Co. of New Jersey, and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co. of New York, for reductions in the prices of their wares.163 
Some multinational companies have agreed to cut their prices by at least 
half. Despite the cut, for example, a year’s supply of a commonly used 
combination of drugs known as a “cocktail” still costs between $2,500 and 
$4,000—out of reach for most AIDS sufferers in China.164 
For the long-term solution to AIDS, vaccines may prove to be the ul-
timate preventative method. However, the patent issue is the source for 
worry. “Few pharmaceutical companies would wait until the completion of 
the drug development to file patent applications. They would apply during 
the process at the time they consider to be most appropriate, adding to the 
difficulties for other researchers or developers.”165 Indeed, “[t]he serious 
situations now forced us to rethink the protection of patents or lives. The 
patients could not wait 15 years for the drug to be available, not even a 
single day.”166 
It is certain that patent has become an acute problem in the global 
combat against diseases such as HIV/AIDS. The issue is whether Rawls’s 
theory can be used to achieve or promote global justice in the context of 
access to medicines. This is our discussion in the next part. 
161. “*ddI-d4T is on US National Institutes of Health (NIH) ‘not advisable’ list (as of 10 Nov 
2003) 
*As a generic, ddI is only legally available in powdered form, which is even more difficult to take.
*NVP should not be used when patient has Hepatitis-B, which is a large % (10–20%) of people in
China. 
*None of the combinations available with domestically produced drugs are on the WHO list of recom-
mended first-line treatment regimens.” China-ARV[i.e. anti-retroviral] Access Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.china-aids.org/english/factsheet-ARV.htm. 
 162. Eric Goemaere et. al., Patent Status Matters, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 23, no.5 (Sept. 2004), availa-
ble at http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/23/5/279.2.full. 
 163. See Goodman, supra note 157. 
 164. Chang, “China Cautions It May Allow Companies to Violate Patents,” The Wall Street Jour-
nal, September 9, 2002, available at http://www.aegis.com/news/wsj/2002/WJ020903.html. 
 165. Battle to Curb AIDS, supra note 152 (quoting Shao Yiming, a Chinese researcher). 
 166. Id. 
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IV. REALIZING GLOBAL JUSTICE
Rawls does not have global justice in his mind; he is not concerned “to 
find a conception of justice suitable for all societies regardless of their par-
ticular social or historical circumstances” and “to settle a fundamental dis-
agreement over the just form of basic institutions within a democratic 
society under modern conditions.”167 Further, Rawls makes it clear that 
“[w]hether justice as fairness can be extended to a general political concep-
tion for different kinds of societies. . .are altogether separate questions.”168 
The transcendental institutionalist represented by Rawls is concerned 
to identify a perfectly just institution to achieve justice within the demo-
cratic society.169 If his theory could be extended to achieve global justice, it 
is believed that it would have to be done through “an impeccably just set of 
institutions”, but that “would certainly demand a sovereign global state, 
and in the absence of such a state, questions of global justice appear to the 
transcendentalists to be unaddressable.”170 
In the debate concerning whether global justice is possible, Nagel 
takes a pessimistic view. He shares Hobbs’ view, that government precedes 
justice; therefore, as there is no global sovereign state, there cannot be 
global justice.171 Further, if all governments were to cooperate to achieve 
global justice, they would inevitably act in their own self-interest, hence the 
impossibility of global justice.172 
Pogge believes that what causes Rawls to refrain from extending his 
theory to all national societies is because the existence of “intercultural 
diversity of traditions and moral judgments” makes it imperative that a 
modern constitutional democracy not “impose [their] values upon the rest 
of the world” or “pursue a program of institutional reform that envisions 
the gradual supplanting of all other cultures by a globalized version of 
[their] own culture and values.”173 
However, Pogge does not believe that intercultural diversity should 
prevent the extension of Rawls’s theory on the global scale. Intercultural 
diversity is not unique between nations; it is also existent within the West-
 167. JOHN RAWLS, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, in COLLECTED PAPERS 303, 305 
(Samuel Freeman ed., 1999). (“KCMT”) 
 168. JOHN RAWLS, Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical, in PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS 223, 225 (Allen Patten ed.1985). 
 169. See SEN, supra note 33 at 80. 
 170. Id. at 25. 
 171. THOMAS NAGEL, The Problem of Global Justice, PHILOSOPHY & PUBLIC AFFAIRS 113, 115 
(Allen Patten ed. 2005). 
 172. Id. 
 173. POGGE, supra note 112, at 278 (Cornell U. Press 1989). 
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ern democracy.174 In fact, it exists in any country.175 When Rawls develops 
his theory, presumably he primarily has the United States in mind, but, 
Pogge questions, “can he claim to speak for the black, Hispanic, and 
[N]ative American subcultures or even for ordinary farmers, clerks, house-
wives, or factory workers?”176 That, however, is no obstacle that precludes 
Rawls from putting forward his theory of justice to “initiate a discourse 
about justice” in the United States.177 On the international front, Pogge 
holds that “a cross-cultural discourse about a substantive moral issue of 
great common concern will broaden the vision of its participants and will 
tend to make the moral conceptions involved less parochial as each tries to 
accommodate what it finds tolerable or even valuable in other cultural tra-
ditions.”178 He then projects that extending Rawls globally allows “a cross-
cultural discourse;” premised on “a small set of widely accepted values and 
ideas,” Rawls’s globalized conception of justice “can offer a good deal of 
flexibility for acknowledging and incorporating cultural diversity.”179 
In realizing global justice, the utopian view of cosmopolitan democra-
cy sets out to have a unifying government on the globe,180 but the possibil-
ity of a unifying government for global justice looks remote.181 In contrast, 
Sen is not concerned to extend a perfectly just institution globally, and 
indeed, he is not even to discuss such an institution in a democratic socie-
ty.182 He departs from Rawls; in his view: 
[There is] the need for a theory that is not confined to the choice of insti-
tutions, nor to the identification of ideal social arrangements. The need 
for an accomplishment-based understanding of justice is linked with the 
argument that justice cannot be indifferent to the lives that people can ac-
tually live. The importance of human lives, experiences and realizations 
cannot be supplanted by information about institutions that exist and the 
rules that operate.183 
Rather, he is concerned to address injustice through public reasoning. 
He focuses on what international reforms are to be implemented so as to 
make “the world a bit less unjust.”184 
 174. Id. at 270. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 271. 
 177. Id. at 271. 
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 180. DANIELE ARCHIBUGI, THE GLOBAL COMMONWEALTH OF CITIZENS: TOWARD COSMOPOLITAN 
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 182. See SEN, supra note 33, at 18. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 25. 
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Sen deplored denial of cheap drugs to the poor patients of AIDS be-
cause of the patent.185 True, it is unjust that the patent system is imposed on 
the developing countries most forcefully through international trade agree-
ment186 while such system is doubtful from the perspective of justice even 
in a democratic society and is shown unsuitable for developing countries. 
The harsh reality under the current world trade organization arrangement is 
that the developing countries members to the WTO must grant patents to 
medicines since 2005 and the Least Developed Countries members must 
grant or enforce patents for medicines from 2016.187 A UN Special Rappor-
teur on the Right to Health noted: 
“The framework of the right to health makes it clear that medicines must 
be available, accessible, acceptable, and of good quality to reach ailing 
populations without discrimination throughout the world. As has been 
evident, TRIPS and (free trade agreements) have had an adverse impact 
on prices and availability of medicines, making it difficult for countries 
to comply with their obligations to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to 
health.”188 
In addressing the injustice, it is imperative that international reforms 
be implemented following public reasoning. One such reform is the Doha 
Declaration as adopted at the Doha World Trade Organization Ministerial 
Conference (November 9–14, 2001).189 The Declaration was arrived at 
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pursuant to the request of some members, mainly pushed by the African 
Group (all the African members of the WTO), for clarification between the 
TRIPS Agreement and public health.190 It is agreed in the Declaration that 
the TRIPS Agreement “does not and should not prevent members from 
taking measures to protect public health” and that “the Agreement can and 
should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access 
to medicines for all.”191 The Declaration underscored members’ ability to 
use the flexibilities built into the Agreement, including compulsory licens-
ing.192 The compulsory license is “a statutory mandate that the [patent] 
rights must be licensed to all comers willing to pay the pre-set price.”193 
The Declaration makes it clear that “[e]ach member has the right to 
grant compulsory [licenses] and the freedom to determine the grounds upon 
which such [licenses] are granted.”194 Though this provision did “not add 
anything substantively to the understanding of TRIPS,” it used the expres-
sion “[compulsory license]” not found in the TRIPS Agreement itself, thus 
resulting in the creation of awareness in developing countries about the 
employment of such a flexibility to meet public health and other objec-
tives.195 
It is an unquestionable right of member States to “to determine what 
constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgen-
cy.”196 It is presumed that public health crises can represent a national 
Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, WTO News: 2003 Press Releases, Press/350, August 30, 2003 
(hereinafter Decision Removes Patent Obstacle). and “The General Council Chairperson’s Statement,” 
WTO News: 2003 News Items, August 30, 2003, both available at http://www.wto.org. The restriction 
under Article 31(f) is resolved by Article 31bis, para 1 which allows the exporting of medicines without 
the limitation. But notification must be made to the Council of TRIPS by both the eligible exporting and 
importing members; notification does not need to be approved by a WTO body in order to use the 
system. The eligible importing WTO member needs to notify the Council for TRIPS of relevant matters 
by specifying the names and quantities of the products to be imported, confirming that it lacks manufac-
turing capacities for the products, and shall grant a compulsory [license] where its patent law grants 
patent for the product; the exporting member also needs to notify the same Council of duration of the 
[license], details of the licensee and the licensed products, quantities to be produced, and the countries 
to supply the products. Article 31bis, para 1 of the TRIPS Agreement as detailed in GENERAL 
COUNCIL, WT/L/641, 8 December 2005, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement 
Decision of 6 December 2005, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. 
 190. Carlos Correa, Implications of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, World Health Organization [WHO], at 1, (June 2012), available at  
http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/WHO_EDM_PAR_2002.3.pdf. 
 191. Id. at 9. 
 192. See Decision Removes Patent Obstacle, supra note189. 
193. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and Collec-
tive Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (1996). 
 194. Correa, supra note 190,at 15. 
 195. Id. 
 196. DOHA Declaration, supra note 194, at para. 5(c). 
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emergency or other circumstances, pursuant to which compulsory licenses, 
if provided under national law, can be granted without prior negotiation 
with the patent owner.197 
Paragraph 5 (c) of the Declaration also illustrates public health crises 
as including “those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.”198 The exemplified cases of epidemics indicate that an emer-
gency “may be not only a short-term problem, but a long-lasting situation,” 
thereby implying that “specific measures to deal with an emergency may be 
adopted and maintained as long as the underlying situation persists, without 
temporal constraints.”199 
In the sense of the relationship between the TRIPS Agreement and 
public health, the Doha Declaration “affirms that the TRIPS Agreement 
should be interpreted and implemented so as to protect public health and 
promote access to medicines for all,” thereby “demonstrating that a rules-
based trading system should be compatible with public health interests.”200 
In a broad sense, the TRIPS Agreement neither establishes a uniform 
international law nor embodies uniform legal requirements. Rather, it gives 
its member States enough leeway to fine-tune to their needs specific to 
their respective national cultural, social, and legislative situations. 
In implementing the TRIPs provisions, WTO member countries may le-
gitimately adopt regulations that ensure a balance between the minimum 
standards of IPR protection and the public good. Moreover, they can 
adopt measures which are conducive to social and economic welfare, 
such as those necessary to protect public health, nutrition, and the public 
interest in sectors of vital importance for their socio-economic and tech-
nological development.201 
A. Evaluation of Compulsory Licensing 
The main objection to the compulsory licensing scheme is that it is 
economically difficult for the needy country with no manufacturing capaci-
ty to persuade another country with the capacity to export generic drugs 
manufactured under compulsory licenses to the former because it is uncer-
tain whether the former would be able to bear the cost.202 Then, the issue of 
compulsory license is subject to the maneuver of the pharmaceutical com-
 197. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 189, at art. 31(b). 
 198. DOHA Declaration, supra note 194, at para. 5(c). 
 199. See Correa, supra note 190, at 18. 
 200. Id. at i. 
 201. Id. at 4. 
 202. .AIDEN HOLLIS& THOMAS POGGE, THE HEALTH IMPACT FUND: MAKING NEW MEDICINES 
AVAILABLE FOR ALL 99–100 (2008). 
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panies and it needs considerable political will to issue such license.203 Such 
a license is far and few in fear of political reprisals.204 Take China for ex-
ample: there was huge public outcry for lack of action by the Chinese gov-
ernment for such a license, and hence affordable AIDS drugs, as far back as 
2001. Some believed that the Chinese leaders had been successfully con-
vinced by American and European pharmaceutical giants that abrogating 
the promises as made by the Chinese leaders would hurt the country’s repu-
tation among investors and undermine its commitment to free trade only 
months after it entered the WTO.205 As a result, 
[The Chinese leaders were] a lot more interested in policing intellectual 
property than in tackling the AIDS problem. They have been dealing 
with IP complaints a lot longer. For the government’s image abroad, it’s 
still a better issue for them”206 
Others argued that in working with the drug industry, the Chinese 
leaders are making a calculation based more on economic expediency than 
on compassion.207 Indeed, the government failed to play an active role in 
promoting the production of affordable drugs; then, there would be low 
profits for generic drug manufacturers in producing generic drugs. Togeth-
er, they combined to result in no Chinese drug companies having ever ap-
plied for a compulsory license so far.208 
Most importantly, some believe that compulsory licensing does not 
promote the long-term health and well-being of developing countries in 
fighting diseases.209 As noted before, the multinational pharmaceutical 
companies geared their investment and research toward diseases in devel-
oped countries. Then, resorting to the scheme of compulsory licensing by 
developing countries exacerbated the problem of lack of research into the 
diseases prevalent in and specific to developing countries and undermines 
the incentives for investment in those diseases by the pharmaceutical com-
panies.210 
By producing generic drugs through compulsory licensing, developing 
countries are accused of refusing to recognize the high cost for R&D. “The 
 203. Id. at 99. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Goodman, supra note 157. 
 206. Id. (quoting Stan Abrams, a patent lawyer at the firm Lehman, Lee & Xu in Beijing). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Newly Revised Measures for Compulsory Licensing of Patent Implementation to Come into 
Force, CHINA INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION (Mar. 21, 2012, 8:28 AM), 
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201203/1285090_1.html [hereinafter Re-
vised Measures]. 
 209. Hollis, supra note 201, at 60. 
 210. Id. at 100. 
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total average cost of developing a new drug is more than one billion dollars 
over the course of 15 years of research and testing.”211 No one can deny 
that someone needs to shoulder the bill, but as Joseph Stiglitz points out, 
“[i]n the current system, those unfortunate enough to have the disease are 
forced to pay the price, whether they are rich or poor, and that means the 
very poor in the developing world are condemned to death.”212 
It is also argued that the issue of compulsory license may risk devel-
oping countries losing pharmaceutical companies selling future drugs 
there.213 Utilization of compulsory licensing, however, does not necessarily 
totally work to the worse of the developing countries; they may lose “the 
potential benefits of life-changing drugs” but “pharmaceutical companies 
also jeopardize their public image by being seen as unethical;” a “lose-
lose” scenario.214 
However, evaluation of compulsory licensing should be put in context. 
In fact, compulsory licensing often works alongside pricing control.215 Both 
share the aim of availability of patented drugs with affordable prices.216 
They are regarded as “complementary policy tools” for developing coun-
tries.217 Use of price control promotes voluntary licensing where develop-
ing countries lack the technical know-how to manufacture the patented 
drug; the threat of compulsory licensing facilitates reduction in prices by 
the multinational companies.218 A stricter compulsory licensing policy is 
recommended because it results in lower price and access.219 
In January 2007, the Thai government issued a compulsory license to 
manufacture the generic version of Kaletra and Plavix. Kaletra is an an-
tiretroviral drug proven effective against AIDS, lowering the death rate by 
84%.220 Plavix is a drug effective at lowering the risk of heart attack. But 
they were under patent; as a result, their exorbitant prices were beyond the 
reach of patients in developing countries.221 The Kaletra license capped the 
 211. Shaira Bhanji, Bullying the Boss? Compulsory Licensing for Antiretroviral Drugs in Brazil 
and Thailand, HAR. C. GLOBAL HEALTH R., Oct. 21, 2011, available at 
http://www.hcs.harvard.edu/hghr/online/bullying-the-boss-compulsory-licensing-for-antiretroviral-
drugs-in-brazil-and-thailand/. 
 212. Joseph Stiglitz, Give prizes not patents, NEW SCIENTIST, Sept. 16, 2006, at 21, 21. 
 213. Bhanji, supra note 211. 
 214. Id. 
215. Eric Bondy & Kamal Saggiz, Compulsory licensing, price controls, and access to patented 
foreign products, 109 J. DEV. ECON. 217, 218–19 (2012). 
 216. Id. at 225. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Bhanji, supra note 210. 
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generic version to 250,000 patients per year; the generic drug manufactur-
er, the licensee, and the Government Pharmaceutical Organization (GPO) 
pay 0.5% of their total sale values as royalty to the drug’s patent owner, 
Abbott Laboratories.222 Likewise, under the Plavix license, the GPO pay 
the same percentage of royalty to Sanofi-Aventis and Bristol-Myers 
Squibb, the patent holders.223 The effect of the threat of compulsory licens-
ing and the chain reaction to the issue of such license itself by other patent 
holders can be identified. First, in 2006, as soon as the Thai government 
threatened to issue a compulsory license, Merck Sharp & Dohme “pro-
posed to reduce the price to 550 Baht/m, [from] 1,400 previously. Our GPO 
can provide at 560/m.”224  Second, subsequent to the issue of the compulso-
ry licenses, Abbott reduced the price of Kaletra and Aluvia to the level of 
the corresponding Indian generic versions.225 It made the new price appli-
cable to other countries “where Abbott’s patents are respected to maximize 
the number of patients that can be provided Kaletra/Aluvia capsules and 
tablets at this new price,” and to Thailand where “Kaletra capsules remain 
available in Thailand and will be eligible for the new price.”226 
The effect of the issue of compulsory licenses quickly rallies develop-
ing countries in taking similar actions to deal with their health problems. In 
Brazil, Merck’s patented AIDS drug, Efavirenz, sold $1.59 per tablet.227 
Like Kaletra, it is a drug with proven effect against AIDS, lowering death 
by 84%.228 The exorbitant price led the Brazilian government to negotiate 
the price with Merck which offered 30% reduction to $1.1 per tablet fol-
lowing the government’s threat of compulsory license, but the reduction 
was not as much as desired, given that its price in Thailand was $0.65 per 
tablet.229 When further negotiation broke down in May 2007, the Brazilian 
government followed the action of Thailand and issued a compulsory li-
cense with a 1.5% royalty to Merck.230 That immediately saved the gov-
ernment $30 million in 2007.231 In March 2012, India issued a compulsory 
license to the local generic pharmaceutical company Natco Pharma to 
 222. Jennryn Wetzler et al., Timeline for US-Thailand Compulsory License Dispute, PROGRAM ON 
INFORMATION JUSTICE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/11/pijip-thailand-timeline.pdf (last updated Apr. 2, 2009) [hereinafter Timeline]. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
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 230. Bondy, supra note 215, at 220. 
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manufacture the kidney and liver cancer drug Nexavar, which was patented 
by Bayer AG.232 The price will be reduced by about 97%, from $5,500 to 
$175 per month.233 Following India, China revised its Measures for the 
Compulsory Licensing for Patent Implementation in 2012 to enable generic 
drug manufacturers to produce cheap drugs used for AIDS and others. Chi-
na is said to have in mind Tenofovir, whose patent is owned by Gilead 
Sciences Inc. Tenofovir constitutes part of a first-line cocktail treatment for 
AIDS sufferers which is on the WHO’s recommended list.234 In September 
2012, the Indonesian government issued a decree which would enable ge-
neric manufacturers to be granted compulsory license to produce life-
saving drugs at low cost and make them affordable, and hence, available to 
patients for seven HIV and hepatitis B treatments which are under patents 
owned by big multinational companies of GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), Merck 
(MRK), Gilead Sciences (GILD), Bristol-Myers Squibb BMY), and Abbott 
(ABT).235 
The public discourse initiated by the issuing of compulsory license 
and through the participation by various players including relevant gov-
ernments, civil societies, international organizations, experts, the public, 
and the patients, helps to regulate the behavior of the patent holders. A 
perusal of “Timeline for [United States]-Thailand Compulsory License 
Dispute,” a collection of major events surrounding the granting of compul-
sory license in Thailand, shows that participation in the debate comes from 
all quarters and all corners of the world: various governments such as the 
United States, Switzerland, and India; international organizations such as 
the UN, the WHO, the WTO, and the EC; hundreds of civil societies and 
NGOs throughout the world; campaigners and experts such as students in 
the UK and James Love; politicians, patients, and consumers; not to men-
tion media and international conferences.236 The salutary public reasoning 
brings the issue of health vis-a-vis patent to the fore and it is no surprise 
that the Thai instance triggers actions by other developing countries. More-
over, it yields results of reduction of prices by patent holders. As seen 
above, the multinational pharmaceutical companies subsequently lower the 
 232. Tan Ee Lyn, China changes patent law in fight for cheaper drugs, THOMSON REUTERS 
FOUNDATION (Jun. 8, 2012, 4:56 PM), available at http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/china-changes-
patent-law-in-fight-for-cheaper-drugs/. 
 233. Revised Measures, supra note 208. 
 234. Lyn, supra note 232. 
 235. Ed Silverman, Pharma’s March Into Emerging Markets Hits Yet Another Rough Spot, 
YCHARTS, PHARMALOT (Oct. 11, 2012), 
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t. 
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prices of drugs for other developing countries as well without their need to 
issue compulsory licenses. Prior to the Thai case, when the South African 
government proposed to use its Medicines Act to increase access to patent-
ed products for AIDS sufferers, 39 multinational drug companies com-
menced legal proceedings and attempted to overturn the Act in March 
2001.237 A big public backlash followed and the companies dropped their 
case.238 After years of international pressure on drug companies, including 
the impetus of public debate and discourse prompted by the Thai case, 
some multinational pharmaceutical companies now agree not to enforce 
their patent for AIDS drugs to enable mass production of them for the 
AIDS sufferers in African countries at a marginal price.239 The U.S. phar-
maceutical group Johnson & Johnson recently announced in 2012 that it 
would abstain from enforcing its patents for Prezista to enable generic 
manufacturers to produce low price and high quality drugs for sub-Saharan 
Africa and “least developed countries” (LDCs).240 Prezista is effective for 
treatment of AIDS patients who develop resistance to traditional antiretro-
virals.241 
The outcome of public discourse is clear; it helps to make affordable 
existing drugs which would otherwise be kept away from a vast number of 
patients in developing countries. In this crucial area of public health, more 
public reasoning with the widest participation is certainly set to realize 
Sen’s aim of addressing the injustice faced by the world’s poorest people. 
B. Beyond Doha 
Doha, together with the subsequent compulsory licensing, is a particu-
lar case concerning extreme diseases such as AIDS which are prevalent in 
poor developing countries where the patent stands in the way to make 
available drugs affordable to patients. To say the least, that is a morally 
strong case to prompt international actions under the TRIPS Agreement. 
However, this particular case should not obscure the issue of global justice 
in a larger sense with respect to patents for other technologies. Developing 
 237. In parallel, following the Al Qaeda attack on New York on September 11, 2001, the US 
government threatened to break the patent on Bayer’s anti-anthrax drug Cipro and manufacture the drug 
itself unless Bayer drastically decreased its sale price. Bayer agreed. “This nervous reaction cast the pall 
of inconsistency over the campaign which US and other multi-national drug firms had been waging 
against South Africa.” See W.R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHT, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS 289 (Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2003). 
 238. Id. 
 239. Ben Hirschler, J&J says won’t enforce AIDS drug patent in Africa, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2012, 
9:00 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/29/aids-jj-africa-idUSL5E8MTAP820121129. 
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countries need breathing space to develop, just as the current developed 
countries once freely used existing technologies for their own development. 
The issue however goes beyond whether developed countries should make 
technologies freely available for developing countries, and whether tech-
nologies alone would uplift the latter from their impoverished situations. 
It is true that the difference principle provides that the most advan-
taged people work to improve the interest of the least advantaged; but 
Dworkin asks, “before devoting social resources to improving the position 
of those with the least income and wealth, should we not, at the very least, 
first investigate how they came to be in that position?”242 Dworkin believes 
that the element of responsibility should be built into the difference princi-
ple and those who opt ,voluntarily, not to be productive and irresponsibly 
land in the situation they are in, have no entitlement to the work of oth-
ers.243 Nonetheless, Dworkin agrees that those having the unfortunate 
“‘brute luck’ of being born with poor endowments, or unforeseeable poor 
luck in other aspects of life,” are the least advantaged and they should be 
compensated for and the economic and social arrangement should be to 
promote their welfare.244 
If we could extend Dworkin’s searching question to the pursuit of 
global justice, we should also ask the Dworkin-style question, what led the 
least advantaged to the position they are in before considering the sort of 
help we should extend? By being born into a poor African country, a per-
son is likely born being the least advantaged. Then when ten children are 
likewise born into the same family, thereby propagating the number of the 
least advantaged, we may feel duty bound to think harder about the concept 
of the least advantaged and the cause, and hence avoidance, of such injus-
tice. No one would doubt ex post facto that they need help and their interest 
needs to be improved. However, should one not, or should they, ask why 
that family chooses to bring ten least advantaged people into the world to 
suffer from diseases and poverty, and knowingly so? Would it not, or 
would it, be true that real justice is to ask whether it is just to bring those 
sufferings into the world mindlessly? Whatever views one may form, it 
must be borne in mind that family planning and birth control are merely 
one factor, and indeed, western donors to Africa often press this issue, but 
 242. Jonathan Wolff, Social justice and public policy: a view from political philosophy, in SOCIAL 
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY 17, 19 (Gary Craig et al. eds. 2008); see Jonathan Wolff, Equality: The 
Recent History of an Idea, 4 J. OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 125 (2007); see also DAVID MILLER, NATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2007) (global justice is defined “not in terms of equality, but in 
terms of a minimum set of basic rights that belong to human beings everywhere”). 
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it is not the only factor; it is further down from the issues of education, 
good government, skills, international trade with other nations, and so on, 
which combine to resolve poverty, diseases, etc.245 
So the aim of global justice should not be at temporary relief. Rather, 
we submit that global justice should involve spreading good government, 
family planning and birth control, good education, and economic develop-
ment. We further submit that, in an interconnected world, no one should 
seriously argue that an evil and corrupt government should be left alone, 
and presenting good government is colonization. The justice here is how to 
work toward the benefit of the least advantaged people.246 The economic 
development of developing countries holds the future for their own capabil-
ity in fighting against diseases, as such countries as China, India, and Brazil 
demonstrate.247 Furthermore, the future of developing countries depends 
more on their own efforts for good government and sound economic policy 
than on outside aid.248 Outside aid, if only in the form of cash handout, 
drugs, or food, may be of rather limited help; even where it would be effec-
tive in helping reducing diseases and improving health, it would likely 
bring about more problems such as over birth and over population - a vi-
cious cycle.249 Plainly, a sound policy for development is imperative;250 so, 
 245. Many African countries have now in place a population policy. In resolving African problems, 
different approaches are suggested, “Rosen and Conly urge Africa to avoid the needs of a rapidly 
growing population through reduction of birth rates. Simon urges Africans to attack poverty by creating 
jobs, marketable skills and products to trade on the international market that people on other continents 
want to buy.” Dallas L. Browne, Africa’s Population Challenge: Accelerating Progress in Reproductive 
Health, 3:2 AFRICAN STUDIES QUARTERLY 82 (1999) (book review). 
 246. Robert Calderisi argues that “Western donors [of aid] do not really fight [corruption in Afri-
ca], because they want to sit at the table with African governments and meet international aid targets, 
rather than asphyxiate political and administrative malpractice.” ROBERT CALDERISI, THE TROUBLE 
WITH AFRICA WHY FOREIGN AID ISN’T WORKING 8 (2007). He further states, “Almost everyone in 
North America and Europe who shares my ideals believes that more aid, along with additional lecturing 
on governance, will help Africa. I want to puncture that illusion. Africans need breathing space more 
than they need money. Not a Marshall plan, but really backing for the few governments that are fighting 
poverty, plus political support for the millions of Africans who are resisting oppression and violence in 
the rest of the continent. Not just formal democracy, but a society where people are free to lead their 
own lives without fear either the government or what their neighbour will say.” Id. at 9. Calderisi is 
sceptical over the claim that African “problems have deep historical or foreign roots – in the slave trade, 
colonialism, the cold war, high debt and behaviour of international organisations.” Id. at 7. 
 247. Fredrik Erixon, Why Aid Doesn’t Work, BBC NEWS (Sept. 11, 2005, 10:54 AM), 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/4209956.stm. 
 248. Farah Abuzeid, Foreign Aid and the “Big Push” Theory: Lessons from Sub-Saharan Africa, 
11:1 STAN. J. INT’L REL. 16, 16 (2009) (“the theory that holds that any aid is beneficial to any country 
no matter the circumstances demands further inspection. The influx of massive amounts of foreign aid 
can have deletrious effects on the governments of the receiving countries, and can end up doing more 
harm than good in several circumstances.”). 
 249. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Why Foreign Aid Fails - and How to Really Help 
Africa, THE SPECTATOR, (Jan. 25, 2014), http://www.spectator.co.uk/features/9121361/why-aid-fails/. 
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too, is the need to “mak[e] institutions more inclusive,” to “chang[e] the 
politics of a society to empower the poor—the empowerment of those dis-
enfranchised, excluded and often repressed by those monopolizing pow-
er.”251 
As far as patent is concerned, it is plain that free technologies may 
help those countries to reduce poverty and alleviate, or possibly resolve, 
health and other crises, and generally to catch up. Free technologies, how-
ever, do not offer the full solution to their problems and indeed they may 
not help in the short-term,252 but that is no reason that the matter of patent 
should not be resolved. At least a debate or reasoning over the matter 
would help to shape the developmental policy for the future of developing 
countries. Public reasoning matters, but the current rhetoric in the debate on 
the patent divide between developing and developed countries is misled. 
Frustrated by the practice of the multinational companies over their patents, 
a few developing countries argue for protection for whatever originates 
from within their borders; those arguing for patents covering products de-
rived from rainforest plants almost exclusively located in developing coun-
tries put forward the strong rhetoric: 
It is a question of intellectual property rights. People whose medical lore 
leads to a useful product should have a stake in the profits. Unless we re-
turn some of the profits to them, it is a kind of theft.253 
The above arguments effectively mean that those developing countries 
want anything, including products of nature, to be propertized by patents, 
but that would only comport well with the wish of developed countries to 
reinforce their world interest by patents.254 The argument by developing 
countries rich in natural resources is understandable, but it misses the point; 
it is talking about fighting for several possible patents whilst inadvertently 
extent of (or in some countries, eradicate) starvation, diseases, and other visible signs of poverty. In-
versely, it is bad economic policies that still keep millions of Africans in deadly poverty.”). 
 251. Acemoglu, supra note 249. 
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admitting several million patents. It would be a futile and hopeless ambi-
tion to compete with the dominance of the West.255 
The way forward is to challenge and change the current intellectual 
property regime; “as [U.S.] military and economic dominance fades, so will 
TRIPS and its consequences.”256 However, the task is far from easy; in fact, 
“[e]fforts to develop an intellectual-property model that bypasses patents, 
such as the one proposed by the Biological Innovation for Open Society 
initiative in 2004, have not progressed very far, and established models of 
innovation will not be overturned in a day.”257 Nonetheless, those efforts 
will undoubtedly initiate the development of a system that “reflect[s] the 
interests of the public.”258 Indeed, public discourse at the national and in-
ternational fronts with respect to each new technology and development 
will lead the way and offer concrete ways to achieve a fairer world order of 
patent and access to new technology and medicine.259 
In an interconnected world where countries could not survive without 
dealing with others, opportunities abound for such reasoning to take 
place——on the negotiation table for international trade conventions and 
human rights conventions, through trade and investment, through education 
and so on. As Pogge advocated, “we ought to use our more advantaged 
political and economic position to work for global institutional reforms.”260 
It is a daunting task but it is not impossible if we start to work toward it. 
Eiseley tells it well: 
There lives a boy who throws starfish in hundreds back into the sea each 
day to save their lives with the full realisation that there are tens of thou-
sands of starfish on the beach that would die if not helped back to the sea 
before the next tide and indeed that most would die as he could only 
throw so many back into the sea each day. 
The story goes on: 
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The old man objected, ‘But there must be tens of thousands of starfish on 
this beach. I’m afraid you won’t really be able to make much of a differ-
ence.’ The boy bent down, picked up yet another starfish and threw it as 
far as he could into the ocean. Then he turned, smiled and said, ‘It made 
a difference to that one!’261 
CONCLUSION 
In this article, we argue that the classical justification of the patent 
system cannot withstand scrutiny under Rawls’s theory of justice insofar as 
it concerns justice. We also argue that such a system is not suitable for 
developing countries. We further argue that, though Rawls does not extend 
his theory globally for global justice, global justice in relation to patent is 
highly relevant in the case of human diseases, such as AIDS, faced by de-
veloping countries and equally so where developing countries have to 
grapple with patent in developing their economy and eradicating poverty. 
Where Rawls does not provide much useful guidance for global justice, 
Sen offers his theory of dealing with injustice through public reasoning, 
thereby avoiding the attempt to implement a perfectly just (if at all) institu-
tion with a global sovereign state; indeed, it is not his interest to pursue 
“transcendental institutionalism.”262 We argue that Senian public reasoning 
offers a salutary point to address the issue of patent by means of engaging 
various players and governments in resolving the injustice stemming from 
the patent system. 
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